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ABSTRACT
In the early 19th century, the Arkansas River Valley existed as a borderlands
region of powerful Indian nations and immigrant Euro-American and Native American
settlers. In the resulting contests over settlement, Cherokee chiefs recreated the Arkansas
Cherokees' ecological identity from hunters to agrarians to differentiate themselves from
their Osage and white rivals. During the 1820s, Cherokee chiefs expanded on their
agrarian rhetoric by appropriating American scientific systems in order to stymie white
settlement. By the end of the 1820s, Arkansas Cherokee chiefs had infused their
arguments of preferred agricultural lands, appropriate survey methods, and accurate
cartography into the debates over the contours of cultural settlement in the region. With
the treaty of 1828, Arkansas Cherokees helped to determine the boundaries of
sovereignty in the Southern borderlands.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1824, the Cherokee Indian agent in Arkansas, Edward Duval, wrote a
surprising report concerning the Cherokees’ contested land claims in the Arkansas River
Valley. The council of Arkansas Cherokee chiefs had insisted that DuVal’s report include
their Cherokee-made map, a “sketch of the country,” showing the full extent of Cherokee
claims to the region between the Arkansas and White Rivers. The disputed lands would
later encompass the mountains of northwest Arkansas and the prairies of eastern Indian
Territory. In the map, the Cherokees’ western boundary extended well west of the
mountainous area acknowledged by federal officials and up to the falls of the Verdigris
River, encompassing a large tract of highly desired prairies and river bottoms known
informally as “Lovely’s Purchase.”
Though Cherokees were concerned about white encroachment from the east,
Duval informed the Secretary of War that the disputed western boundary of Cherokee
claims was “the greatest… source of discontent...among the nation.” Half of the
Cherokee towns on the map lay west of the most recent American survey boundary,
which was also drawn on the map. The mapmaker made sure to depict that, per the
survey, Cherokees were restricted to “a large portion of mountainous and unarable
lands.” For an agricultural society, such restrictions were tantamount to an attack on their
future prosperity. Put simply, the map, commissioned by Arkansas Cherokee chiefs,
visually consolidated Cherokee negotiating strategies to use appeals to agricultural land
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use and American survey systems to dispute settlement patterns in the Arkansas River
Valley.1
The Arkansas Cherokee map was only one of numerous communications with
federal officials wherein Arkansas chiefs attempted to shape the contours of settlement in
the Arkansas River Valley. This thesis particularly centers on the area between the
Arkansas and White Rivers, west to the Verdigris, that includes the bottomlands of the
Mississippi Delta, the uplift of the Ozark Mountains, and the eastern prairies of the Great
Plains. Between 1812 and 1828, Arkansas Cherokee chiefs redefined the nation’s
ecological identity from an immigrating group of hunters to a highly agricultural society.
Given the reality of the Cherokees’ mixed hunting-farming land use, this agrarian identity
was more an attempt to present a civilized society than a consensus reality.2 As Arkansas
Cherokees encountered competition over land from other white and Native American
groups, Cherokee leaders moved beyond ecological rhetoric to develop hierarchical,
highly adaptive, and environmentally-grounded negotiating strategies that used scientific
survey and cartography systems to assert Cherokee settlement interests in the Arkansas
River Valley.
During the early 19th century, the Arkansas Valley was a southern borderland
where waves of migrating Euro-American and Indian societies encountered a
geographically diverse landscape occupied by long-time Native and European
inhabitants. Thousands of Cherokees from Tennessee and Georgia voluntarily migrated
1

Edward Duval to the Secretary of War, March 1, 1824, The Territorial Papers of the United States: The
Territory of Arkansas, 1819-1825, ed. Clarence Carter, vol. 19 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1953), 613. Hereafter noted as Territorial Papers. The described map has not
been located.
2
Kathleen DuVal, “Debating Identity, Sovereignty, and Civilization: The Arkansas Valley after the
Louisiana Purchase,” Journal of the Early Republic 26, no. 1 (2006): 25–58 While DuVal examines
Cherokees’ attempts to define themselves as civilized agrarians, my thesis narrates how that selfcharacterization was, in fact, part of a longer series of rhetorical strategies from Arkansas Cherokee chiefs.
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Figure 0.1 Derek Everett. The Arkansas Frontier. In Derek Everett. “On the Extreme Frontier:
Crafting the Western Arkansas Boundary,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 67, no. 1 (Spring
2008): 2. The Arkansas River Valley contained a unique congruence of western waterways,
bottomland forests, mountain uplifts, and prairies. Through much of the 1820s, Cherokees and
white settlers vied for control of the region north of the Arkansas River and west of the Ozark
Mountains, much of which was included in the popularly named “Lovely’s Purchase."

west decades before the forced removal of Cherokees. Their arrival aided American
efforts to push Southeastern Indian nations west of the Mississippi, though with the
unwelcome consequence of inciting jealousy and even violence with Osage Indians and
with American settlers also lobbying the federal government for rights to the same lands.
Cherokee immigrants established their prominence in the Arkansas River Valley by the
late 1810s, initially promoting themselves as ideal hunters in the fur-rich region before
Arkansas chiefs intentionally transformed their ecological identity to one of Europeanlike agriculture.
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Cherokee’s ecological rhetoric proved successful in contrasting the immigrant
society with the Osage, but Cherokees turned to more scientific arguments to counter
white settler intrusions into the Arkansas Valley. After 1820, Cherokee chiefs began to
denigrate the poor agricultural lands of the mountains and clamored for more Osage
prairie lands to the West. Cherokee chiefs also used official meetings with federal agents
as well as informal encounters with American scientific expeditions to promote
Cherokees’ agrarian interests. However, white settlers dampened the impact of Cherokee
agrarian rhetoric by promising to utilize the prairie lands for agriculture as well, thus
increasing the threat of white settlement to the west of the Cherokees. In the early 1820s,
Cherokee chiefs turned to survey systems to hinder settlement of Lovely’s Purchase by
questioning the methods and results of American survey teams. This tactic held off white
settlement for several years while expanding Cherokee acreage in the Arkansas Valley.
The Cherokee map in 1824 thus served as a visual demonstration of Cherokee claims
regarding arable lands and survey lines, and it placed Cherokee cartography in
conversation with recent Anglo-American maps of the Arkansas Valley. However, the
western lands remained contested as Cherokees and white settlers offered competing
visions of patchwork settlements along ecological boundaries and clear cultural
segregation. The 1828 treaty between the Arkansas Cherokees and the federal
government ultimately established a stark cultural boundary between Cherokee and
Anglo-American settlements as the Cherokees abandoned their Arkansas homes while
gaining the fertile lands of Lovely’s Purchase to the west.
Arkansas Cherokee chiefs’ use of environmental language, survey systems and
cartography constituted an adaptable and multi-faceted effort to re-furbish Anglo-
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American knowledge systems to exert Cherokee influence over settlement west of the
Mississippi.3 Historians of the Arkansas Valley have gone so far as to describe the region
as a “Native Ground” into the 1820s, dominated by native diplomacy.4 However,
Cherokees’ appropriation of Anglo-American science and ecological rhetoric enabled
Cherokees to determine the boundaries of regional settlement, and to thus maintain their
influence in the Arkansas Valley, far beyond the 1820s.
The contest over regional settlement patterns created highly political settings in
which the exchanges of environmental knowledge between Cherokees and Americans
developed.5 Cherokee chiefs sought to control their environmental messaging in formal
encounters with American governmental representatives, like agent Edward Duval.
However, they also personified agrarian identities during informal encounters with
American scientists journeying through the region in the exact period that they formally
advocated an agrarian identity.6 Throughout the 1820s, these chiefs maintained an
effective dialogue with federal officials, capitalizing on federal interest in Indian removal
and seeking to use their agriculture identity to gain access to new lands. For historians of
For more on early American and Indigenous cartography, see Juliana Barr, “Geographies of Power:
Mapping Indian Borders in the ‘Borderlands’ of the Early Southwest,” The William and Mary Quarterly
68, no. 1 (2011): 5–46; Martin Brückner, Early American Cartographies (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2011).
4
Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) While DuVal’s analysis ends in the 1820s with the decreasing
power of Arkansas Cherokees and the closing of the “Native Ground,” my thesis regarding Cherokee
environmental strategies is less bold in its implications. As such, my work suggests the continued influence
of Cherokee political geography in the Arkansas River Valley throughout the antebellum period.
5
Susan Scott Parrish, American Curiosity: Cultures of Natural History in the Colonial British Atlantic
World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006) Parrish’s work analyzes the transmissions of
scientific knowledge during the Enlightenment Era, extending the source of scientific knowledge across the
Atlantic to North America. My thesis extends the cross-cultural knowledge study geographically and
temporally into the early American West and while also highlighting Native American appropriation and
dissemination of scientific systems and knowledge.
6
James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 2000) Merrell’s landmark work on frontier negotiations in Pennsylvania argues
that cross-cultural dialogue weakened over the course of the 18th century. Borrowing his methodology of
examining the specific sites of cross-cultural encounter, my thesis reveals how Cherokee chiefs enforced a
consensus, hierarchical dialogue that largely stabilized discussions on the western frontier.
3
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early American environmental science, the pivotal role of immigrant Cherokees in
horizontal knowledge transfers in the Arkansas River Valley elevates Indian roles in 19th
century American science as well as the influence of Cherokee migration in Southern
environmental history.
Understanding Arkansas Cherokees’ adaptive environmental ideologies in the
Arkansas River Valley’s varied and contested geography brings this southern borderland
into discussions of early American science and Native American political power. Rather
than focus on lowland cotton, Cherokees and their rivals were engaged in a contest over
how to harness the varied ecologies of mountains, alluvial plains, and sparse prairie.7 By
the late 1820s, debates raged over whether Cherokees should remain isolated in the
mountains and surrounded by white farmers in the fertile lowlands or if they should be
removed well west of the fertile Lovely’s Purchase region. These environmentallyinformed debates became proxies for discussions of political geography, science,
ecology, race, power, and identity in the Arkansas borderlands. In the Treaty of 1828,
however, a Cherokee delegation made the controversial decision to leave the mountains
but gain access to the highly-coveted prairies along the Arkansas. With this final treaty,
Cherokees wrote their environmental interests into the contours of the antebellum
Arkansas River Valley settlement.

For more on southern environmental history in Arkansas, see Joseph Patrick Key, “Indians and Ecological
Conflict in Territorial Arkansas,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 59, no. 2 (2000): 127–46; Conevery
Bolton Valencius, The Health of the Country: How American Settlers Understood Themselves and Their
Land (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Christopher Morris, The Big Muddy: An Environmental History of
the Mississippi and Its Peoples from Hernando de Soto to Hurricane Katrina (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012) Morris’ work is the most prominent recent southern environmental history to
examine Indian and American relations west of the Mississippi Valley. My work, though, expands the
geography of southern environmental history by examining those cultural encounters in southern mountains
and prairies as well.
7
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CHAPTER 1
ECOLOGICAL RHETORIC
CHEROKEE HUNTERS AND THEIR ALLY, THE UNITED STATES
Waves of Cherokee migrations in the late 18th and early 19th century brought
thousands of Cherokees west of the Mississippi, eventually settling along the Arkansas
River Valley in a variety of hunting and farming communities. Despite the diversity of
practices, as Cherokee chiefs jockeyed for land cessions and federal aid, Cherokee
leaders successfully promoted a Cherokee ecological identity focused singularly on
hunting to gain treaty rights and even fur trade support in Arkansas. Capitalizing on
federal interests to settle the Arkansas Valley with friendly allies, Arkansas Cherokees
helped to define the valley as a hunting region and position themselves as some of its
most profitable agents in the American fur trade.
Prior to the Louisiana Purchase, Cherokee hunters had already recognized the
Arkansas River Valley as one of the most promising hunting regions in southern North
America. Months after the Purchase, federal officials reported that “a scarcity of game on
the eastern side of the Mississippi has late induced a number of Cherokee, Chactaws
[sic], and Chickasaws to frequent the neighborhood of Arkansas, where game is still in
abundance.”18 The increased pressures on deer, bison, and other game in the Southeast

18

An Account of the Indian Tribes in Louisiana, September 29, 1803, Territorial Papers 13: 60.
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had made the Arkansas region some of the most promising hunting grounds for
westward-moving populations.19
In 1809, Cherokee leaders from the Chickamauga region of Tennessee promoted
Cherokee hunting practices to convince the federal government to support their removal
to the Arkansas region. Thomas Jefferson, the outgoing president, listened to Cherokees
“desirous to move across the Mississippi” where they might “retain their attachments to
the hunter’s life, and having little game on their present lands,” and invited them to
“reconnoiter the country on the waters on the Arkansas and White Rivers.”20 Following
the stated agreement, hundreds of Cherokee families crossed the Mississippi and settled
amongst Cherokee families already living in the St. Francis River bottoms to the north of
the Arkansas River watershed. 22 Hunting parties soon traveled the mountains and valleys
to the west as well as in the extensive cane brakes along the St. Francis.
Cherokees in the St. Francis River Valley, in fact, practiced a mixed-agricultural
and hunting subsistence, but the hunter rhetoric of the 1809 discussions was re-energized
following a series of earthquakes in beginning in late 1811. In the spring of 1811, a
young Cherokee chief informed an American agent that “we have good corn
fields…plenty of Cattle & hogs…Buffaloe and Deer.”23 However, months later, the
ground around the St. Francis River shook violently in a series of earthquakes that sunk

Patrick Key, “Indians and Ecological conflict in Territorial Arkansas” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 59,
no. 2 (Summer, 2000), 134.
20
Jefferson to Cherokees, January 9, 1809, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, 2: 125. Robert A.
Myers, “Cherokee Pioneers in Arkansas: The St. Francis Years, 1785-1813,” The Arkansas Historical
Quarterly 56, no. 2 (1997): 127–57.
22
John Treat to the Secretary of War, Dec. 31, 1806, Territorial Papers 14: 56. For more on the political
debates amongst lower and upper Cherokee towns for removal to Arkansas, see S. Charles Bolton,
“Jeffersonian Indian Removal and the Emergence of Arkansas Territory,” The Arkansas Historical
Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2003): 253–71.
23
Meigs to Secretary of War, April 6, 1811, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group
75.19.8, Records of the Cherokee Indian Agency, East (National Archives, Washington, D.C.)
19
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the once promising lands into a swamp-like region. The Cherokee prophet Skawuaw,
fearing that the earthquakes were a sign of disfavor, called for Cherokees to give up
Anglo-American practices and migrate west to the Arkansas where they might “plant
corn and hunt in peace.”24 While The tensions between Cherokee agricultural practices
and rhetoric followed the western immigrants to the Arkansas.
Cherokees incorporated the Arkansas Valley’s varied geography into their
subsistence practices even as leaders largely highlighted their less agricultural practices.
A year after the earthquakes, Toluntuskee, the chief who had led the recent migration
from Tennessee, wrote to an Agent that the Cherokees had “settled among the
mountains” of the Arkansas.25 Despite Toluntuskee’s assertion, the Cherokees built their
major settlements in the alluvial bottoms along each significant tributary to the Arkansas
with only dispersed homesteads among the Ozark Mountains to the north. The Ozark
Mountains, ranging several hundred square miles above the river, were the recently ceded
hunting grounds of the Osage Indians, but white settlers noted that the Cherokee
councilmen had successfully negotiated for a “rich and valuable tract of country” along
the Arkansas River upon which they were soon clearing land for farms and even taking
over the homesteads of American squatters.26 In contrast with Cherokee leaders’ rhetoric,
Cherokees, who had also incorporated the bison hunting grounds to the west, were
bringing the area’s diverse landscapes into production under their mixed subsistence
practices.
Louis Bringier, “Notices of the Geology, Mineralogy, Topography, Productions, and Aboriginal
Inhabitants of the Region Around the Mississippi and Its Confluent Waters,” American Journal of Science
and Arts 3 (1821), 39-40. For more on the environmental history of the New Madrid Earthquakes, see
Conevery Bolton Valencius, The Lost History of the New Madrid Earthquakes (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2013).
25
Talontiskee to Meigs, March 14, 1813, Records of the Cherokee Indian Agency.
26
William Russell to Delegate Hempstead, November 1, 1813, Territorial Papers 14: 720.
24
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These immigrants from the Tennessee River Valley possibly felt that the
environmental adjustment to the Arkansas River Valley would be quick. Five hundred
miles from their homeland, Cherokee families had found the region west of the
Mississippi that was the most topographically similar to the Chickamauga area. The
Tennessee River winds through the eroded, 2,400 feet elevations of the Cumberland
Plateau much like the 2,400-feet vertical relief of the Arkansas flowing south of the peaks
of the of the Ozark Plateau. The Cherokees were also on familiar soils. Today, the
Southern Appalachian soil region includes the noncontiguous Arkansas River Valley.
Both contain similar Utisol soil, with small bands of a silty alluvial soil along the river.28
Some locations possibly bore such similarity that Cherokee place names were repeated
from the Tennessee to the Arkansas Valley.29 In choosing to move to the Arkansas River
Valley, Cherokees had found familiar geographical and ecological surroundings west of
the Mississippi in which to practice their mixed-agrarian lifestyle.
Ironically, despite Cherokees’ declarations of hunting acumen and their potential
environmental familiarity, immigrant Cherokees relied on local area hunters to acclimate
to the ecological potential of their new region. Cherokee hunters were only the latest
inhabitants of this well-regarded hunting region and agreed to follow “tallowing folks,”
hunters who collected only fat from bear and bison carcasses, to maintain meat supplies
in their first years in the Arkansas Valley. Indian agent William Lovely reported that

“Georgia Soil Survey 128 - Southern Appalachian Ridges and Valleys | NRCS Georgia,” accessed
February 28, 2017,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/ga/soils/surveys/?cid=nrcs144p2_021879.
29
Chataunga Mountain, the eastern boundary marker of the 1817 Indian Treaty, was possibly a corruption
of the Cherokee word gadusi, “hill.” An 1824 letter marked it as “Chatanuga mountain” which bears
remarkable similarity to a modern spelling of Chattanooga, meaning “a rock that goes up to a point,” which
has present-day use near Chickamauga Creek in Tennessee. Jeannie M. Whayne, Cultural Encounters In
the Early South: Indians and Europeans in Arkansas (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1995),
147. Edward Duval to Secretary of War, March 1, 1824, Territorial Papers 19: 613.
28
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these hunters would “kill the buffaloe & leave the carcass” to rot in the “hunting
grounds,” and Cherokee hunters saw an opportunity to simplify their early hunting
excursions.32 These unidentified hunters might have been French or American hunters in
the region who were acting as guides to the newly arrived Cherokees. Unfortunately,
there is little record of what the first Cherokee scouts thought of the Arkansas River
Valley; however, Arkansas Cherokee hunters would actively hunt the region for at least
the next decade, and Cherokee leaders continued to negotiate for American aid around
this hunting identity.
Several years after arriving in the Arkansas Valley, immigrant Cherokees used
their hunting practices to seek sought greater economic support as well as land cessions
from the federal government. Land negotiation had stagnated as eastern Cherokees
refused to approve land cessions in exchange for lands in Arkansas.35 To push for
American economic support, however, Cherokee repeatedly invoked their hunting
potential to seek institutional support from federal officials, including their own agent to
Josiah Meigs, commissioner of the General Land Office. Based on a letter from Meigs to
Secretary of War William Crawford, Cherokee’s ecological marketing as hunters was
proving successful. Nearly five hundred “may be considered as good hunters & good
warriors,” Meigs would write. With this self-proclaimed ready-made force on the
frontier, a fur trade “Factory might be placed with great prospect of advantage to the
government.” Within the mountains and prairies of the Arkansas Valley, Cherokees could
reap profit from the “almost immense quantity of the finest furs and peltry” and increase

32

William Lovely to Governor Clark, October 1, 1813, Territorial Papers 15: 51.
In fact, eastern Cherokee wished immigrant Cherokees were “compelled to return and live with the
nation.” Secretary of War to Indian Commissioners, September 17, 1816, Territorial Papers 15: 174.
35
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trade of 15,000 furs in in the lucrative market at New Orleans.36 No longer were
Cherokees following European hunters. In three short years, these new Cherokee
immigrants were defining the region by its hunting prospects and positioning themselves
as its prime ecological and economic agents.
In an era of mounting tensions between the United States and Indian nations,
Arkansas Cherokees and U.S. officials found cooperation based on Cherokee hunting
practices to be mutually beneficial. For federal officials, the Cherokee negotiations were
likely welcomed because they addressed ongoing problems on the western frontier. The
Arkansas Valley was part of a region over which American officials recognized they
were “not in in sufficient strength, of men or means…to occupy or control.”37 Military
projections in 1817 judged the “roving bands” of western Indians to be around 20,000,
and protection against “hostile” and “dispersed” Indians still likely required an “expense
of millions.”38 With over 2,000 Cherokees immigrants in Arkansas, American officials
eagerly considered the prospects of a friendly border population. Meigs fur-trade plan
entailed acquiescing to Cherokee interests for a “home” near the U.S. supported factory
with the hopes that Cherokee warriors could be relied upon as “a force at any time at the
service of the United States.”39 Cherokee hunters potentially solved the problems of
frontier unrest that had worried American officials for a decade.
Cherokees also replaced Osage hunters in the Ozark Mountains as more
advantageous trade partners for the American government. Osage hunters, hoping for
closer ties to the United States, had ceded their Ozark Mountain hunting grounds in 1808.

36

Josiah Meigs to Secretary of War, February 17, 1816, Territorial Papers 15: 121.
Governor Wilkinson to Secretary of War, September 22, 1805, Territorial Papers 13: 227.
38
Indian Tribes in Missouri Territory, August 24, 1817, Territorial Papers 15: 304.
39
Josiah Meigs to Secretary of War, February 17, 1816,Territorial Papers 15: 121.
37
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During those negotiations, American officials were reminded of the lucrative potential of
the hunting grounds as “the [Osage] expressed more concern for the loss of the Hunting
Country on white river, than any other lands they were about to seed [sic] to the United
States.”40 Nonetheless, federal support for Cherokee settlement and hunting in the region
was much louder than for the Osage. Less hostile to the federal government, Cherokees
migration also supported federal efforts to gain lands east of the Mississippi. The
prospect of a factory among the Cherokees added monetary interests to the equation for
supporting Cherokee settlement and increased the to the handful of frontier fur trading
posts at which deer, bear, bison, and elk were more profitable to regional trade than
subsistence farming .45 With the promise of U.S.-friendly frontier forces and a fur trade
that would benefit U.S. merchants, American officials had interest in promoting
Cherokee migration to Arkansas country, not simply removing Indians from the
southeast.
Remarkably, Cherokee settlement in Arkansas also displaced white squatters.
Land speculators in the region complained that the Indian agent William Lovely was
removing white settlers from their houses and homes. William Russell, a St. Louis-based
land agent reported that “Indians were going from farm to farm, allotting one farm to
[one] Indian, and another farm to another.”48 Lovely himself even acknowledged that
measures needed to be taken to “keep peace and harmony between them and their white

40

William Clark to Secretary of War, September 23, 1808, Territorial Papers 14: 224.
For more on the multi-racial frontier exchange economy, see Daniel H. Usner, Indians, Settlers, & Slaves
in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1992).
48
William Russell to Delegate Hempstead, November 1, 1813, Territorial Papers 14: 720.
45
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brothers;” however, the developing policy of making the Arkansas Valley an Indian land
persisted, even to the direct detriment of white settlers.49
Despite the hopes of federal officials, federal support for Cherokee settlement
based on Cherokee hunting interests increased violence and unrest along the frontier.
Winter hunts took the Cherokees high up the Arkansas River and passed settlements of
Osage. The Osage, bitter that their land cessions were being considered for Cherokee
settlement, frequently clashed with Cherokees over these contested hunting grounds.
Cherokee and Osage war leaders led attacks in which they murdered hunters, raided
villages, and stole horses. The violence compelled the federal government to establish a
frontier outpost at the present-day sight of Fort Smith to keep the peace between the
warring nations.
The United States government remained willing to support Cherokees’ westward
migration even if it led to war between the Cherokees and Osage. John C. Calhoun,
Secretary of War, urged the territorial governor to “as far as practicable…make the
arrangement favorable to the Cherokees.”51 The federal government, desperate for
voluntary Indian migration, was willing to support Cherokee hunting interests even if
those interests compromised frontier peace.
In 1817, President Monroe and the Cherokee chiefs codified Arkansas
Cherokees’ self-promotion as hunters in the signing of the Turkeytown Treaty. While the
treaty would perhaps be best known for its “acre for acre” exchange of lands in Georgia
and Tennessee for millions of acres in Arkansas, the opening lines reveal the extent to

49

William Lovely to the Cherokees, July 20, 1813, Territorial Papers 14: 721.
Secretary of War to Governor Clark, May 8, 1818, Territorial Papers 15: 390. For more analysis of the
power struggles between Osage and Cherokees for control of the region, see chapter 7, “A New Order,”
DuVal, The Native Ground.
51
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which Arkansas Cherokee negotiators had embedded their hunter identity into the
negotiation. Referring to the 1808 negotiations with Thomas Jefferson, the treaty reiterated that “deputies…ma[d]e known their desire to continue the hunter life...across the
Mississippi River.”52 As Cherokee leaders negotiated using historical agreements, the
consistent ecological language of hunting and game scarcity proved to be successful in
gaining an invitation to move to the Arkansas Valley, in advocating for economic support
from a fur factory, and in adding pressure for the 1817 land cession treaty.
In less than a decade in the region, and only five years after arriving in the
Arkansas Valley, Cherokees had established themselves as a hunting population able to
provide a formidable border population to the benefit of the United States government. In
using the rhetoric of traditional hunting culture, Cherokees did not attempt to identify
with European motifs of the noble savage, or even vie for land based on a protoenvironmentalist strategy. Instead, the hunter ecological rhetoric offered clear economic
and political advantages for settlement in the Arkansas River Valley. Though their
presence antagonized rival Osage and white settlements, Cherokees had become a
pioneer nation extracting resources from the Arkansas valley and protected by legal
treaty. Nonetheless, Cherokee leaders in Arkansas would soon begin a public
transformation of their ecological identity from hunters in the prairies and mountains to
settled farmers on the river.
FARM CULTURE
The ink was days old on the Turkeytown Treaty when Arkansas Cherokee leaders
began to shift their political and ecological language towards an agrarian identity. In the

“Treaty with the Cherokee, 1817,” Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 2
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 141.
52
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summer of 1817, as rains fell greater than they had at any point during Cherokee
inhabitation of the Arkansas River Valley, Cherokee chiefs wrote directly to the
Governor of Missouri Territory claiming that “to raise our crops for the support of our
families has been our wish.”58 Though Cherokees had long practiced farming even prior
to their migration from the Tennessee Valley, Arkansas chiefs began to express agrarian
ideologies through their statements about Cherokee agriculture, the Arkansas Valley
landscape, and political geography. A focus on farm ground was new to a sovereignty
debate originally focused on hunting grounds, but the Cherokee leaders perhaps were
testing a way to distinguish themselves as civilized agriculturalists in contrast to
uncivilized Osage hunters.59
Cherokee agricultural rhetoric likely shifted gradually among Cherokee leaders.
In February 1818, President James Monroe wrote to Arkansas chiefs that the United
States would permit the Cherokees to have “good mill seats, plenty of game, and not to
be surrounded by the white people.”60 Rather than a denial of Cherokee hunting practices,
Cherokee negotiators seem to have advocated for access to game in the mountains and
prairies as well as rights to Ozark streams capable of supporting grist mills. Cherokee
families had long practiced this mixed agriculture in the Arkansas River Valley, but the
first indications of agrarian rhetoric in political negotiations only appeared in the months
following the Turkeytown Treaty.

58

Cherokee Indians to Governor Clark, July 11, 1817, Territorial Papers 15:304; David W. Stahle and
Malcolm Cleaveland, “Texas Drought History Reconstructed and Analyzed from 1698 to 1980,” Journal of
Climate 1, no. 1 (January 1, 1988), 61.
59
For more on Cherokees appropriating the language of European civility, see DuVal, “Debating Identity,
Sovereignty, and Civilization”; For more on the agricultural development of Arkansas, see S. Charles
Bolton, Arkansas, 1800–1860: Remote and Restless (University of Arkansas Press, 2014).
60
The President to the Arkansas Cherokees, February 1818, Territorial Papers 20: 333.

16

This shifting mixed agrarian rhetoric also indicated transitions in gendered
ecological practices amongst Cherokees. Despite a rhetorical shift to agricultural
lifestyles, in Cherokee marriage customs in Arkansas as late the early 1820s “the groom
presents his venison, and the bride her corn.”61 Early immigrant Cherokee leaders had
thus associated Arkansas Cherokee society with male hunting practices. The new
negotiation emphasis on mill seats and agricultural production might have indicated
increased economic opportunity for Cherokee women. Conversely, the shift to
agricultural practice might have indicated that some Cherokee males were shifting to
agriculture, thus keeping the chiefs’ rhetoric male-oriented while appealing to American
agrarian gender practices.62 Regardless, the development of mills would have aided
Cherokee women’s participation in the Cherokee economy. Given accounts of male
Cherokee farmers, though, the agricultural rhetoric was a reference to shifts in gendered
labor practices within some sectors of Cherokee society.
While Cherokees employed a mixed ecological identity of farming and hunting to
request a variety of American aid, Cherokee leaders employed stronger agrarian language
when seeking to distinguish themselves from their Osage rivals. Cherokee chiefs re-cast
their immigration to the well-hunted region of the Arkansas Valley as removal to a “new
and unexplored wilderness.” Such a reference to the Arkansas “wilderness” as
undeveloped and potentially dangerous, a familiar motif in American settler rhetoric,
suggested that Cherokee chiefs were situating themselves within the European narrative
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of westward-moving civilization.63 In the morality tale of civilizing pioneers, Cherokees
easily recast Osages as a “band of savages” who “inhumanely murdered, butchered, and
plundered” Cherokee settlements.64 Associating uncivilized Osage with the undeveloped
landscape of Arkansas hinted that Cherokees’ agrarian rhetoric was part of a larger
ecological and cultural identity that Cherokees carefully crafted for political negotiations.
The strong agricultural rhetoric even spilled into judgements of the Arkansas
landscape itself. Cherokee chiefs complained that the lands they had been granted were
“encumbered with barren mountains,” thus necessitating more fertile lands to the west.
For a society so recently removed to the mountains, complaints about the relative
unfitness of the Arkansas mountains for their land use practices represented a startling a
new negotiating tactic in their contest with Osage to the west.
Nonetheless, Arkansas Cherokees appeared to experience internal shifts to
promote greater amounts of agriculture. In 1818, John Jolly, a recent arrival from the
eastern Cherokee, was elected the principal chief of the Arkansas Cherokee in a short
contest with a much more traditionalist chief, Takatoka. Jolly was, in fact, much more
amenable to Cherokee agriculture. He became an early supporter of a New England
mission for Cherokee children that taught American-style agriculture to Cherokee boys.65
For Arkansas Cherokees who did, in fact, turn to agriculture, cow and pig livestock
replaced seasonal hunting as the source for meat. Corn and cotton became the prominent
crops of Cherokee farmers who were clearing cane breaks and forests along tributary
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streams. Some apple and peach orchards could be seen from the river. In a letter to
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, Jolly promised that Cherokees would “settle more
compactly” in Arkansas in newly established farming settlements than in dispersed,
hunting oriented settlements.66
Despite a perceptible internal shift towards greater agricultural emphasis and a
diplomatic rhetoric sometimes decidedly agrarian, outside observers likely remained
skeptical of Arkansas Cherokees. Internal reports among federal officials continued to
focus on the hunting-based tensions with the Osage.67 White settlers complained that
Cherokees had been unfairly given the best soils of the Arkansas Valley.68 Eastern
Cherokees overwhelmingly perceived Arkansas Cherokees as reliant on hunting to the
detriment of civilized agriculture and husbandry.69 The Cherokees’ agrarian rhetoric was
simply one diplomatic tool in a sea of competing interests who, by the end of the decade,
found greater advantage in remembering Cherokee hunting practices than welcoming
Cherokee farming rhetoric.
In the months following the Turkeytown Treaty acknowledging Arkansas
Cherokees’ hunting practices, a subtle rhetorical shift moved Cherokees’ diplomacy
towards an ecological diplomacy grounded in mixed agriculture, and at times a decidedly
agrarian identity. Shifts between the two new identities seemed to be gradual as
Cherokees sought economically diverse aid or contrasted themselves firmly with the
hunting economies of their Osage rivals. While initial reception of this diplomatic
rhetoric was mixed, Cherokee chiefs would soon seek to maintain this new agrarian
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identity through the centralized voice of the Cherokee council. This hierarchical structure
would prove to be highly adaptable in responding to external challenges to a consensus
Cherokee identity.
COUNCIL VOICE
Cherokee leaders were successful in implementing this rhetorical shift by utilizing
a consensus approach in Cherokee councils and a consistent ecological language that
centered on Arkansas Cherokee’s agricultural practices. Despite dividing power between
a principal chief and district chiefs, Arkansas Cherokee chiefs frequently delivered a
singular voice in deliberations with American officials both verbally and in writing. By
controlling the language of these formal encounters, Cherokee chiefs persisted in
promoting their new agrarian identity during negotiations.
Deliberations between Cherokee councils and federal officials repeatedly invoked
the singular voice of the Cherokee chiefs. In an 1819 letter signed by 16 Cherokee chiefs,
they identified themselves as the collective “Arkansas Cherokee Chiefs” and jealously
guarded their authority as spokesmen for “we the Cherokees of the Arkansas.”70 Edward
Duval was once careful to note that he was reporting on a council convened at “the
request of the chiefs and headmen of the Cherokee nation.”71 Thus, Cherokee chiefs
positioned the council, and by extension themselves, as the locus of formal encounters
with American negotiators
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Letters and transcriptions extended Chiefs’ consensus voice beyond the council
house and offered the benefit of direct communication. As Cherokee chiefs
communicated directly with John C. Calhoun, the Secretary of War, they re-iterated their
authority as a governing body. Furthermore, the lists of chiefs included at the end of
every letter indicated the broad approval of terms, and council letters never mentioned infighting among the chiefs.72
However, numerous letters were marked with the “X” of illiterate chiefs, which
threatened to damage Cherokee chiefs’ well-controlled message. Cherokee chiefs found a
solution in James Rogers, who provided the otherwise illiterate Cherokee chiefs a recent
immigrant, the son of a Cherokee mother and Irish father, who acted in the official
capacity of translator. Able to write in English, the young Rogers was the Cherokee chief
who notarized the 1817 treaty emphasizing Cherokee hunting interests. He later
represented the Cherokees in a three-person mission to advocate for Cherokee access to
salt springs in the western prairies.73 With literate, bi-lingual Cherokee translators
embedded in the council hierarchy, Cherokee chiefs re-enforced their developing agrarian
message in both verbal and written testimony.
In this hierarchical and centralized negotiating model, Cherokee agrarian identity
solidified. The “Chiefs of the Arkansas Cherokee” continued to describe a “barren
country fit for nothing” two years after having first lamented a landscape with “barren
mountains” and few resources. The letter was addressed to the Secretary of War and
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signed by seven Arkansas chiefs, led by John Jolly. 74 Coincidentally, in an expedition
report published that same year, Stephen Long’s chronicler Edwin James described that
same region in almost identical terms as “mountainous and barren, and unfit for
cultivation.”75 Cherokee chiefs had not only found a consistent voice, but their agrarian
identity drew them parallel, at least in language, to the famed western explorer Stephen
Long.
Given the Arkansas Cherokees’ isolation on the extreme western edge of the
American frontier, the chiefs’ apparent strategy of official, consensus language might
have sufficed to convince others of their new agrarian identity. After all, even their Osage
rivals were imitating the hierarchical agrarian language when referring to the Cherokee
economic system. In a remarkable 1821 speech to the Osage council, the Osage chief
Clermont acknowledged that “we cannot farm like the Cherokees…[nor] learned how to
raise Hogs and Cattle like the Cherokees.”76 In rhetoric, and practice, the Cherokees’
rivals were beginning to see Cherokees as a powerful agrarian society in the Arkansas
River Valley.
During the turn of the decade, however, the arrival of prominent scientific
expeditions was an unexpected threat to the validity of Cherokees’ agrarian rhetoric. Two
prominent Anglo scientists visited the Arkansas River Valley in 1819 and 1820,
necessitating an expanded strategy beyond general councils. The Cherokee leadership
had long sought to control written communications for their agrarian identity, and the
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scientists’ reports could have been an uncensored revelation of Cherokees’ continued
hunting activities. Instead Cherokee leaders capitalized on informal encounters with these
Anglo-European scientists outside of the controlled setting of the council house. The
chiefs, mostly wealthy and agrarian, appeared in the reports as the personifications of
Cherokee farming identity, creating an ad hoc two-pronged strategy wherein Cherokee
chiefs shifted their ecological identity in formal channels as well as travel literature.
Cherokees found risk and opportunity in the reports of Stephen Long and Thomas
Nuttall. Long would later be recognized for his enduring description of the “Great
American Desert” while Nuttall published some of the first popular descriptions of
Cherokee settlement on the Arkansas. Their scientific analyses of the ecological potential
of the Arkansas River Valley was of great interest to prospective American land buyers.
In fact, eastern Cherokees would use Long’s description of the Great American Desert a
decade later to combat attempts for forced removal. In these scientific expeditions,
Cherokees encountered an unanticipated opportunity to define their identity on the
western frontier for white Americans’ cultural consciousness.
The most pressing threat to Cherokees, though, was that these explorers deprived
Cherokee chiefs of the ability to censor written descriptions of Cherokees’ ecological
practices. Cherokees’ ongoing tensions with the Osage necessitated a civilized language
of agricultural practice, but, unlike in careful descriptions of council discussions, they
could not write the scientists’ reports. In fact, Cherokees’ fears would prove partially
validated. Stephen Long would later note that “of late years, the Cherokees have almost
uniformly been the aggressors…and all the Cherokees of the Arkansas are in the habit of
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hunting and committing depredation upon the Osage hunting grounds.”77 Differentiation
from the Osages was a key element of Cherokee diplomacy, and Long’s description
equated Cherokee and Osage hunters while suggesting that Cherokees were largely at
fault for much of the frontier unrest. By calling all Cherokees depraved hunters in one
sentence printed in 1823, Stephen Long might have unwittingly undone over a half
decade of intentional Cherokee rhetoric.
Additionally, despite the new agrarian rhetoric of Cherokee chiefs and societal
changes towards settled agriculture, hunting among Arkansas Cherokees remained
widespread. In 1819, the year Nuttall traveled up the river valley, over 15,000 dear skins
were delivered to the fur factory at Belle Point.78 By 1821, the Arkansas fur factory was
the western frontier’s leading supplier of bear oil, second leading supplier of deer skins,
second leading supplier of raccoon skins, provided 276 wolf skins, 159 beaver pelts, and
easily provided the most bear skins at 346. The Cherokees’ local factory was the second
most profitable post west of the Mississippi.79 With the relative success of the fur factory
and reality that many Arkansas Cherokee continued to supplement farming produce
through hunting excursions, rhetorical descriptions of Arkansas Cherokees that
emphasized agriculture intentionally ignored the continued hunting practices of many
Arkansas Cherokee families.80
Indeed, Long and Nuttall interacted with numerous Cherokees who undermined
claims of Arkansas Cherokee agrarianism. A detachment of Stephen Long’s expedition
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arrived in Cherokee territory from the west, and encountered several parties of Cherokees
who “frequently visit this vicinity on hunting excursions.”85 To compound the issue,
male-centered hunting limited Anglo contact with Cherokee women performing
traditional farming roles. Thus, it was Cherokee males who were entrusted as guides due
to their growing landscape knowledge. Both Long and Nuttall also employed individual
Cherokees to conduct the expeditions through the mountains and prairies of the Arkansas
valley. As Cherokee men earned two dollars to direct these scientists to “traverse [the]
rugged and mountainous region[s]” around the Arkansas Valley, the carefully crafted
messages of chiefs were nowhere to be seen.86
Facing the threat of a weakened agrarian rhetoric, Cherokee chiefs made a
concerted effort to position themselves as the primary informants of the expeditions.
While the Cherokee hunters had gone unnamed, specifically identified principal chiefs
populated the travel journals’ more personal descriptions. “Walter Webber, a Metis, who
acts as an Indian trader, is also a chief of the nation,” Nuttall explained, of the man who
also signed onto many Cherokee council documents. His “several negro slaves, a large,
well cleared and well fenced farm” reinforced the agricultural promise of Cherokee
settlers.87 John Jolly appeared in Nuttall’s work as “a Franklin amongst his countrymen”
who “dressed as a white man” and was “scarcely…distinguished from an American.”
One host told Long of Cherokees’ long history with “the culture of cotton.” By
welcoming these travelers into their homes, Cherokee chiefs exploited a series of
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informal encounters that provided an explicit agricultural contrast to their more
traditional, hunter brethren.
Cherokee chiefs also manipulated the white American scientists’ limited
communication skills in arranging these informal encounters. English speaking among
the Arkansas Cherokees was sporadic. In fact, English speaking was more common
amongst farming communities than traditional hunting communities.88 Cherokee hunters,
despite their expanding knowledge of the Arkansas landscape, were therefore constrained
by in their relative inability to communicate with American scientific groups. Long’s
expedition recorded an encounter with Cherokees on a “hunting excursion” who
“communicated with considerable ease by means of signs.”89 While sign language
offered a convenient cross cultural communication tool amongst plains inhabitants, the
information transfer in Anglo-Cherokee encounters was limited to sharing general
directions and locations. Indeed, Nuttall alluded to his preference for bi-lingual,
“civilized Cherokee, with whom alone I could conveniently hold converse.”90
Intriguingly, some Cherokee chiefs could only converse as “civilized” hosts
through the bilingual abilities of their slaves. Cherokee chiefs welcomed the opportunity
to influence the scientists’ perceptions, but were only successful given their status as
slave holders. One traveler reported that Walter Webber, one of John Jolly’s closest
allies, dressed “in the costume of the whites” but “would converse only in the Cherokee
language” even though he understood English. Instead, Webber insisted that his black
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slave act as interpreter.91 Webber was not alone in this strategy. Tom Graves, another
chief, lived in a home “surrounded with enclosed fields of corn, cotton, sweet potatoes.”
Unable, or unwilling to speak English, he alternated between sign language and the
assistance of “a black girl, one of his slaves, who interpreted the Cherokee language.”
Whether Webber or Graves intended to emphasize their ownership of slaves, Long’s
subsequent report mentioned Cherokee slave ownership, thereby re-enforcing Cherokees’
agrarian identity. Regardless, the Cherokee chiefs’ approach worked. Despite depictions
of widespread hunting, Long, undoubtedly to the delight of Cherokee chiefs, noted that
Cherokees on the Arkansas were “almost exclusively agriculturalists, raising large crops
of corn and cotton.” 92 Slave ownership thus enabled some Cherokees chiefs to control
informal encounters and to re-enforce the agrarian message of their official council
communications through their position as slaveholders.
Cherokee chiefs’ personification of agrarian lifestyles was likely re-enforced by
the scientists’ river travel corridor. Many of the Arkansas Cherokees’ wealthiest citizens
occupied the river bank settlements and presented perhaps an outsized impression of the
nation’s European-like habits.93 Traveling up the Arkansas River by pirogue in 1819,
Nuttall observed “both banks of the river were lined with the houses and farms of the
Cherokees.…well fenced and stocked with cattle,” offering the impression of a “happy
approach towards civilization.”94 The Arkansas Valley thus appeared to water-born
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travelers as the location of fertile lands being actively transformed into a civilized
landscape by Cherokees.
The combination of crops and slaves among riverside Cherokee settlements
convinced Anglo-American observers that plantation culture was being advanced by
wealthy Cherokees. While Americans never described Arkansas Cherokee leaders as
explicitly as planters, they did refer to Cherokee “plantations,” largely based on their
agricultural production and land clearing.95 Other American travelers defined Cherokee
plantations by the presence of agricultural equipment and the ability of Cherokees to
control human labor to clear the “rich forests and luxuriant cane brakes…for their
plantations.”96 As such, Cherokee leaders’ control of slave labor, whether to act as
interpreters or in their ability to subdue the Arkansas landscape for crop production,
provided a material example to their agrarian rhetoric. While American travelers did not
specify the number of slaves on these plantations and suggested that they were
“scattered” in number and situation, these and their participation in the highly-esteemed
plantation society.
Cherokees, whose agricultural centers were often established along the banks of
the rivers, also had their knowledge of cropland evaluated by these passing scientists.
These scientists noted that Cherokees had constructed farms on “considerable tracts of
fertile land” along the river.99 Nuttall’s naturalist perspective provided an implicit
approval of Cherokees’ soil judgement. American soil science in the period was still in its
infancy. The scientific team of Long’s expedition used vernacular techniques like the
“occurrence of black walnut” to mark boundaries of regions where “soil [is] somewhat
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adapted to the purpose of agriculture.”101 The few scientific soil samples tests in the
Arkansas valley would only appear towards the end of the 1820s. Most would comment
on the high salt content in the Ozark region of the valley because of the “salt works” west
of the Cherokee lands. Commentators a decade later would declare cotton as “most
productive in alluvial soils a little touched by salt.”102 The scientists’ river pathway thus
framed all Cherokee-Anglo interactions in an agricultural lens and demonstrated
Cherokees’ knowledge of soil fertility to the white American readers.
To counter widespread evidence of traditional Cherokee hunting practices,
Cherokee chiefs had to control the agrarian message in formal negotiations while also
navigating the potentially detrimental visits of American scientific expeditions. The twopronged nature of navigating formal and informal encounters with American officials and
scientists had required a highly adaptable approach from Cherokee chiefs, whether in the
use of translators or in understanding the power of written testimony. The agrarian
language, coupled with the agricultural practices of prominent Cherokee chiefs,
suggested that Arkansas Cherokees could be civilizing agents upon the landscape and a
“civilized…example” to the “interior Indians,” namely the Osage.103 In the pursuit of
distinguishing themselves from the Osage, the fundamental shift to agrarian language had
proved to be a successful tool for the Arkansas Cherokees.
LIMITS OF AGRARIAN RHETORIC
While Cherokees were successful in asserting an agrarian identity to distinguish
themselves from their Osage competitors, the emphasis on Cherokee agricultural
practices did not prove as successful in challenging white settlement. In the late 1810s
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and early 1820s, Arkansas Cherokees faced a new threat in the form of white settlers
hoping to settle west of the Cherokees’ mountainous lands. Cherokee leaders reemployed their agrarian language but the results were mixed. White settlers continued to
threaten Cherokee settlement, and Cherokee leaders turned to a superior knowledge of
the human geography and settlements in the Arkansas Valley region to assert their power
in land negotiations.
In the years surrounding Arkansas’ creation as a territory, Americans were
extolling the fertility of the western fringe of the Arkansas Valley. While the Cherokees
occupied the Ozark highlands, to their west the mountains seemingly shifted immediately
to hills and prairies. Much of the area was bought by Indian agent William Lovely in
1816 as a buffer between Cherokees and Osages, and it became popularly known as
Lovely’s Purchase. The American commander at Belle Point, later Fort Smith, called the
lands west of the Cherokee territory “extremely rich and fertile, well-watered and
timbered.”110 While Stephen Long famously described the Great American Desert as “a
wide sandy desert…forever…the unmolested haunt of the native hunter, the bison, and
the jackal,” he, too, noted Lovely’s Purchase’s “fertile prairie [and] many advantageous
sites for plantations.”111 Buoyed by such pronouncements, Lovely’s Purchase was
quickly becoming the next locale for white settlement.
Territorial officials advocated for white settlers to replace Cherokees as the
inhabitants of Lovely’s Purchase. Prospective cotton growers were already establishing
farms during the expeditions of Long and Nuttall, and American officials wanted to
protect a valuable salt work from Indian claims. In 1823, the acting governor appealed to
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the Secretary of War to open settlement to white families. He promised that on the three
million acres of desirable land, “five to ten thousand souls, without exaggeration would
be residents upon it and cultivating it next spring.”112 According to territorial leaders, for
the Arkansas Territory to flourish, white settlers were the key to a population surge that
could double the territorial population in a year and create a new border population to
replace the Cherokees.
Cherokees simultaneously prized the region and dreaded American settlement in
Lovely’s Purchase. As early as 1820, numerous Cherokees were “restless” to move west
upriver and settle on in the Purchase lands.113 They were likely drawn by the promise of
plentiful hunting grounds along with fertile soil. Moving West also would solve their
fears of being encircled by white settlement. As Cherokee chiefs again reminded
President James Monroe in 1821, they felt that previous treaty negotiations had
confirmed that Arkansas Cherokees would “not be surrounded by white people.”114 For
whites and Cherokees alike, the eastern prairie, not the mountains, was the most desirable
environment of the Arkansas Valley.
As the Cherokee leadership had done in their disputes with the Osage, Arkansas
chiefs utilized an agrarian rhetoric by dismissing the ecological potential of the
mountains, perhaps to demonstrate their civilized practices and to appeal for access to the
west. It was in these deliberations for more western lands that Cherokee chiefs lamented
that “we shall have a mountainous, broken—barren country fit for nothing among all the
good land.”115 The claims of poor “fitness” would be repeated to bolster Cherokee
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arguments for either more western lands or to block white settlement. A Cherokee
delegation in Washington pleaded with the Secretary of War to not “place us in a county
unfit for agricultural pursuits.”116 In the contest with white settlers, any references to
mixed land use were gone, replaced by a staunchly agricultural need.
In contrast, American officials frequently diverted discussions of Arkansas Valley
land from agricultural quality to simple quantity. These officials affirmed that their only
obligation was to “make the quantity of and allotted to them on the Arkansaw equal to
what they surrendered East of the Mississippi.”117 Besides a promise in 1817 negotiations
for lands full of game and the establishment of mill seats, American officials made no
commitments regarding the quality of lands for agricultural use. In fact, despite
occasional white settler claims to the fertility of Cherokee farm grounds, maps and
physical descriptions of much of Cherokees lands echoed the judgement of the barren,
mountainous land put forth by Cherokees. As such, American officials largely enjoyed
the benefits of a straightforward acre-for-acre “exchange of country” with Cherokees.
Additionally, white settlers could easily counter Cherokee’s agrarian rhetoric. No
longer were Cherokees in a contest with an Osage society that openly admitted a “strong
desire to change their mode of life” and sought to “imitate the [Cherokee] example.”118
Rather, white settlers offered themselves as a pro-active civilizing force on the landscape,
promising to change “the now useless forests on our western limits…into cultivated
fields.”119 Without a clear advantage in rhetoric, Cherokees seemed to add their greater
geographical knowledge to their repertoire of negotiating tools.
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Cherokees attempted to capitalize on the federal governments’ occasional lapses
in human geography knowledge. American officials suffered from a significant lack of
human geographical understanding. Cherokees had often acted as guides for scientific
expeditions, positioning themselves, rather than American troops, as the most
knowledgeable of the landscape. In one telling episode, President Madison assured a
delegation of Cherokee chiefs that he would seek to purchase from the Quapaw that he
thought were west of the Cherokee. Unfortunately, it came to light that the President
“was mistaken, and that [the land] belonged to the Osage.”120 Though the land was
subsequently acquired from the Osage, the federal government had had to bear the burden
of constructing and maintaining the military outpost at Fort Smith to negotiate relations
between the now-warring nations.
While the episode in question was partially rectified by American officials,
Cherokees frequently sought to exploit their knowledge of the landscape’s inhabitants.
During disputes in 1823, the federal government attempted to force 1,000 Cherokees
living south of the Arkansas to relocate onto their treaty lands. Cherokees
outmaneuvered federal officials by noting that the land belonged to the Choctaws via a
treaty.121 Cherokee chiefs also attempted to organize their lands to extend the northern
line of Cherokee claims up above the “Buffaloe Fork” where they would have “200
families of Shawnees and Delaware Indians” as neighbors.122 One delegation even sought
to “concentrate the Shawnees on our western border” in order to protect against white
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encroachment.123 The federal government seemed self-aware of their poor geographical
knowledge. Stephen long’s 1823 map very obviously labeled the areas of settlement of
each Indian nation, perhaps to aid in future negotiations. Nonetheless, Cherokee attempts
to play the chess board of other nations’ lands largely failed. By 1825, the Cherokees
were the only nation remaining in the interior of Arkansas Territory.
The Cherokee’s agrarian rhetoric, even coupled with a superior knowledge of
cultural settlement, did little to stymie white settlement. Surveyors employed to mark the
western limits of Cherokee settlement were already closing off Cherokee lands from
Lovely’s Purchase, perhaps even hoping that Cherokees would become “excessively
dissatisfied” and exchange their lands.124 With the growing threat of surveys and white
settlement, Cherokee chiefs shifted their negotiating strategy from a rhetoric of ecological
identity to the science of the American survey system.
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CHAPTER 2
RECRAFTING AMERICAN SCIENCE
SURVEY SYSTEMS
By 1823, American officials had taken the first scientific steps to open lands in
Lovely’s Purchase to extensive white settlement; survey teams were sent along the
Arkansas River to mark the eastern boundary of the Cherokee treaty land as well as to
determine its western limit. Cherokee chiefs adapted to the impending encirclement by
shifting their ecological negotiating framework from culture to the heart of American
science: precision. While never dismissing the survey system, Cherokee chiefs
undermined the results by questioning the survey methods and exact acreage and refusing
to approve the survey finding. Their scientific strategy kept the western boundary
unsettled for several years.
Survey teams helped to rationalize landscape around Cherokees for public sale
and provided key geographical information for a government frequently pursuing policy
with limited understanding of the actual environment. Survey officers stressed that the
accuracy of initial lines would become the basis for the accuracy of all subsequent
surveys. Given the tedious work of marking off 640 square acres for townships, survey
teams in Arkansas were directed to first survey areas that might prove the most lucrative
for land sales. They were also politically-driven. Surveyors were encouraged to extend
townships to “the lands adjoining the westerly part of the Cherokee boundary” if they
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seemed “a good quality and fit for settlements.”125 Such townships capitalized on quality
soil and simultaneously enclosed Cherokees in the mountains.
The Cherokee council’s scientific strategy used the strength of the survey
system—its precision methods—to challenge both the method and the results of the 1823
survey. According to treaty agreements, Cherokees were guaranteed 3,285,710 acres
between the Arkansas and White Rivers. Before allowing surveys to commence,
Cherokee leaders requested to “appoint a commissioner” to accompany surveys along
their western border.126 It became the first instance of Cherokees seeking oversight of the
survey process, but Cherokee leaders would offer more subtle critiques as well. Several
months later, the chiefs simply dismissed the “three million…some odd acres of land”
while arguing simply that “we have not a sufficiency of land allowed us.” Requesting
more land, they hoped, would require officials to add acreage from land ceded in
Alabama and cause delays by requiring a new survey.
However, Cherokees also questioned the methods and starting point that survey
teams had undertaken to conduct their survey. Curiously, the situation of the survey
results prompted John Jolly to leave the collective voice of the council and address the
Secretary of War directly. Not only had he found the acreage insufficient, but he
challenged two elements of geographical framework of the survey. The survey had
started at the eastern Cherokee boundary line rather than the western boundary, limiting
Cherokee ability to include some of the fertile riverside plains on their western border.
Interest in shifting the survey team to the west represented an attempt at Cherokee control
of an American scientific system. More egregiously, the survey had included more land
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along the rugged White River to the north and less on the densely populated and fertile
Arkansas valley. Jolly asked that Cherokees receive a “fair construction…[as] we are
entitled to as much front on one river as the other.”127 Jolly’s complaint of limited
Arkansas River frontage echoed an earlier letter from the collective council that lamented
“we shall not have more than seventy miles [total] on the Arkansas and White Rivers”
with adjacent white settlement blocking any outlet to the west.128
Cherokee challenges to the survey results caused uncertainty and discord among
federal officials. Matthew Arbuckle, the commander at Fort Smith, formerly called Belle
Point, remarked to the Secretary of War of “the anxiety of the people of this territory as
well as the Cherokees on this subject.“ Though he advised a quick solution and
mentioned Cherokees’ preferences to remove west to Lovely’s Purchase, the survey
challenges had caused local agitation that was relayed directly to John Calhoun.129
Several months later, reports inside Washington D.C. swirled that the surveys had been
“badly done.”130 In addition to the unsettled Cherokee boundary, it had poorly marked
lines and frequently charted accessible but poor soil areas. By throwing metaphorical dirt
in the precision machine of scientific surveys, Cherokees had scored a reprieve.
In fact, in contrast to the urgent solution advocated by Arbuckle, Cherokee chiefs
found their best solution in keeping the western boundary unresolved indefinitely. In
March of 1824, a Cherokee delegation to Congress requested that “all the lands from the
Lower Cherokee lines… to the Osage boundary line remain and be unsettled and
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untouched…until the quantity ceded by the Cherokees shall be ascertained.”131 Cherokee
chiefs saw great opportunity in making the survey system a tool for Cherokee benefit and
refused to approve the 1823 survey.
The Cherokee strategy of maintaining unresolved survey boundaries was in some
ways more accommodating than their older ecological rhetoric. Cherokee chiefs had
utilized the shift from a hunting identity to a ‘civilized,’ agrarian identity to secure
Cherokee interests in the face of Osage and white competition. In the survey disputes,
Cherokee deliberations around the survey results, including their delegates’ promise to
Congress to indefinitely “confine their settlement,” suggested greater compromise. While
evidence of Cherokee interest in the western lands was well established, the Cherokees
were willing to pursue an intermediate plan of simply keeping white settlement off the
land rather than annexing it for themselves. The appropriation of survey systems for
Cherokee interests also demonstrated the adaptable negotiation tactics in the political
geography of western lands.
Nonetheless, the debate over the specificity of the survey system proved much
more successful for Cherokee chiefs than agrarian rhetoric. White settlement in Lovely’s
Purchase would remain suspended for nearly three more years. In the meantime, federal
official re-adjudicated the amount of ceded Cherokee lands east of the Mississippi with
an 1825 survey team. The survey proved to be a crucial part of Cherokee diplomacy, as
they gained roughly a million more acres, increasing their land in the Arkansas Valley by
one third. American officials, now on the losing end of federal surveys, internally
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expressed relief that the additional 200 square miles of Lovely’s Purchase territory did
not include the valuable salt springs or all its choice farm land. 132
Arkansas Cherokee Chiefs had essentially turned the survey system against its
own purpose. For a system that was geared to “ascertain the quality of the country” for
sale and settlement by whites, Cherokees had used survey precision to gain leverage in
the settlement debate of Lovely’s Purchase, gained an indefinite reprieve, and even
increased its land allotment. However, this would not be the last time Cherokee Chiefs
inserted themselves into the systems of American science systems to limit American
settlement. Perhaps the Cherokee leadership’s most surprising strategy was to incorporate
the breadth of their rhetorical, geographical, and scientific arguments into the tools of
American cartography.
HYBRID CARTOGRAPHY
Amid the debate over survey lines, Cherokee “chiefs and headmen” requested a
council with Edward Duval to convene near the Illinois Bayou. Their primary objective
seems to have been to deliver a map to Duval, who would then send the map directly to
the Secretary of War. With the “sketch of the country,” the council hoped to “illustrate
more clearly…their opinions and wishes in relation to the lands ceded to them.” While no
copy of the map is known to exist, Duval was apparently so impressed by it that he
included a detailed description of its cartographic style and content in his report. Based
on his descriptions, the map was meant to visually consolidate the council’s various
ecological, geographical, and scientific arguments of the previous several years.
Furthermore, in the contest for control of the American west, Cherokees had inserted
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Figure 2.1 Zebulon Pike. The First Part of Cap’t Pike’s Chart of the Internal Part of Louisiana.
Map. [ca 1:2,534,400]. Philadelphia: C. & A. Conrad, 1810. Zebulon Pike’s map was one of the
first American maps to offer detailed renderings of the Arkansas River Valley and its geography.
While Pike’s chart provided federal officials a better understanding of the waterways and
settlements of the region, the geographical distortions of the region would not be corrected for
over a decade. Descriptions of the imprecise quality of the 1824 Cherokee map suggest that it
might have looked similar to Pike’s depiction of the Arkansas Valley.

themselves into the growing cartographic representations of the Arkansas River Valley
and asserted their own influence over settlement in the region.133
The Cherokee cartographer had created a map more interested in the relative
distribution of territory than precise scientific lines. According to Duval, the most
important visualization of the map was to demonstrate “the upper settlement of the
Cherokees & the relative position of their lands according to the recent survey.” The key
information was therefore the human geography of the region. The mapmaker was
certainly careful to include the environmental resources of the region, even sketching the
Barr, “Geographies of Power.” Barr argues that Spanish officials acknowledged and even incorporated
Indian territorial claims into their own official maps. Maps served at the primary means for this exchange
of geographical knowledge. Brückner, Early American Cartographies. Brückner argues that recent studies
of cartography have over-emphasized the development of precise mapping. This insistence on
Enlightenment style maps obscures the plethora of maps, such as Indigenous ones, that emphasized cultural
organization more than scientific precision.
133
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“small bayous emptying into each river,” but the map was not fussy about exactness. As
Duval first described it, “it was not given as a correct delineation of… rivers or
topography of the country.” The political geography of the region, which Cherokees had
previously utilized in refusing to remove from Choctaw lands, was evident in the
Cherokee map.
Despite the emphasis on relative locations rather than precision, the map was, in
fact, specifically created to add further contestation over the survey lines of Cherokees’
western boundary. Perhaps using the imprecise river channels to his advantage, the
mapmaker drew the “great disproportionment” between the amount of land given to
Cherokees on the White River rather than the Arkansas. For council members delivering
the map, the message was clear: “the manner in which the line for the upper boundary [as
they term it]” was a gross negligence to Cherokee interests on their western boundary.
The map had been made in response to the recent survey, and it seemed clear to Duval
that shifting the western boundary further west was “the principle inducement and object
of this communication.”134 The Cherokee debate over the contested western boundary
had made its way into a diplomatic map.
Though created in response to the survey line, the map was related to a growing
development of American cartography in the Arkansas Valley. Maps of the western
territories were only gradually filling in empty space of the Louisiana territory. The
shifting populations were quickly rendering earlier maps obsolete. Zebulon Pike’s
“Chart” of his western exploration had been printed in 1810, well before the settlement of
Cherokees along the Arkansas. Given the embarrassing episode in which the President
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had mistaken the region’s human geographical knowledge, it was little surprise that one
of the most important aspects of Long’s exploration was the publication of a map in 1822.
Long’s map acknowledged the political implications human geography of the
Arkansas River valley. While Pawnee and Choctaw settlements were identified on the
map, the Cherokee, Osage, and Quapaw figured so prominently that much of the new
territory appeared to be labeled as Indian lands. On Long’s map, the Cherokee,
furthermore, were largely associated with the mountainous region of Arkansas and while
the prominent settlements demonstrated their dominant presence in the region. The region
west of the Cherokees was well watered with tributaries and invited investment given the
unassociated “salt works.” These salt works, the only resource mentioned on the map,
were frequently referenced by regional commentators, one of whom supposed they could
“supply…the whole of this country…with salt.”135 Long’s map was later sent to the War
Department to visually demonstrate the “limits of the Lovely’s Purchase” and clarify a
“rapid sketch” of “efforts to…remove the Indians further west.”136 The use of Long’s
maps for political understanding reveals the ongoing cartographic developments in which
the Cherokees made their own map.
Like the later Cherokee map, the Long map highlighted the broad political and
human geography of the region. Long had used the series of maps drawn by Zebulon Pike
after his 1807 journey, but Pike’s charts were less interested in mathematical precision,
instead identifying the relative position of individual settlements and sites of historical
significance. Long’s Arkansas map outlined both the theoretical survey lines of Indian
cessions as well as areas of Indian prominence. Reflecting a growing interest in
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Figure 2.2 Stephen Long. Geographical, Statistical and Historical Map of Arkansas Territory.
Map. In A Complete Historical, Chronological, and Geographical American Atlas. 35.
Philadelphia: H.C. Carey and I. Lea, 1822. The Stephen Long expedition created detailed reports
of much of the landscape of the Arkansas River Valley. Long’s map made the landscape legible
through cultural and environmental notations. Long, differently from Zebulon Pike or the
Cherokee cartographer, reported that his map was drawn according to precise daily measurements.
His map also demonstrated how overlapping Euro-American and Indian settlements developed in
the context of the geography and natural resources of the Arkansas Valley.

geographical positioning, Long cautioned that the map “projected[ed] conformity to the
results of numerous astronomical observations, but at places at present not known by
[name] to fix to them.”137 His large map, the “Geographical, Statistical, and Historical
Map of Arkansas,” notably included all the Louisiana Purchase north of Arkansas as well
as his excursion’s path, sites of historical note, and the first print of his famous moniker
“Great Desert,” west of Arkansas Territory. Long’s mixture of survey lines, geographical
coordinates, and Indian sovereignty offer a profound interweaving of measurement and
humanity in the Arkansas valley.
Where the Cherokee map fundamentally differed from the Long map was in its
depiction of the western extent of Cherokee settlements. Apparently stringing out
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Cherokee settlements far up the river, the mapmaker drew the “injurious” survey line
such that more than half of the Cherokee population was “cut off, or left without & above
the line.” Such a survey line would have had to have been drawn from the council house
at Dardanelle to be accurate, and there is no evidence of that action from the survey
teams. Nonetheless, the mapmaker clearly inserted this distorted survey line to seek
“ample and complete justice” from the government. Proper justice, according to council,
was “80 to 100 miles of front on the Arkansas.” The Cherokees were engaged in a war of
maps with Long.
While distorting the western reach of Cherokee settlements, the Cherokee map
also claimed more land than any American map or official had previously offered. The
map extended west all the way to the falls of the Verdigris River, effectively the western
edge of the disputed Lovely’s Purchase area. In doing so, Cherokees literally mapped out
the area that American officials knew many Cherokees wished for. Yet, in contrast to
those western prairies, the mapmakers drew the survey results to show that the 1823
survey would had restricted the Cherokees to “a large proportion of mountainous country
and unarable lands.”138 Perhaps having sketched the contours of mountain uplift, the
mapmaker gave cartographic expression to the agrarian rhetoric that Cherokees used to
prove their own civilized status.
Much like the Cherokee appropriation of the survey system, the Cherokee map
proved a successful hybrid of American scientific tools. Borrowing elements of recent
American cartographic depictions, particularly Stephen Long’s map, Cherokees depicted
the environmental and demographic conditions of the Arkansas Valley to challenge the
1823 survey system. Given Duval’s apparent amazement at the map and Cherokees’
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successful challenge to the 1823 survey, the Cherokee chiefs’ supplementing of agrarian
language with scientific literacy positioned Cherokees in an influential position once
again in the debates over settlement in the interior of the continent. These maps, though,
hinted at irreconcilable visions among Cherokee and American settlers regarding how to
develop the cultural settlement boundaries in the Arkansas Valley.
PATCHWORK LANDSCAPE
The success of Cherokee chiefs’ environmental, geographical, and scientific
strategies did not finalize the Arkansas Valley settlement patterns so much as keep the
council in a position of persuasion to influence settlement. The territorial legislature also
sought a solution to regional settlement that favored white farmers, while federal officials
hoped to keep frontier tensions in check and continue to encourage southeastern Indians
to emigrate voluntarily. However, the maps of Long and the Cherokees, highlighted an
ideological divide between Cherokees who sought a clear segregation from white
settlement and white Americans who debated between segregation and inclusion based
on ecological zones. The resolution of this debate with the treaty of 1828 would
ultimately determine the contours of settlement in the Arkansas River Valley.
The Cherokee map demonstrated a decided interest among Cherokees to remain
segregated from white settlers. Cherokee chiefs had repeatedly requested to not be
“surrounded by white people.” The 1823 map extended Cherokee claims to the western
extent of viable farm land. Some reports in Washington occasionally described “restless”
Cherokees who sought to move up river. However, the council interest seemed to be to
maintain the lands along the Arkansas while extending Cherokee rights further west. In
1825, a delegation to Washington declared “we cannot remove from houses and farms
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anymore…our desire is to concentrate Shawnees on our western border.” To announce
this policy, an 1825 Cherokee law promised death to any member of the nation who
proposed a sale or exchange of lands.
Thus, when the Cherokee mapmaker extended Cherokee claims to the falls of the
Verdigris, perhaps 80 miles west of the Cherokee boundary, the message was that
Cherokees intended to remain on the western border by simply adding the desirable land
to the west. “Surely it cannot be the wish…of the government to monopolize all the good
lands for our white brethren,” the delegation exclaimed.139 Cherokees sought to cross
ecological boundaries by claiming both the barren hills as well as the fertile alluvial
plains.
Surprisingly, the separation of Cherokees and white was debated amongst
American officials and white settlers. A survey of the western Cherokee boundary might
have had the effect of surrounding Cherokee families—limiting them small parcels of
farmland along the Arkansas and with a preponderance of mountain landscape. In 1824,
white settlers anxious about access to Lovely’s Purchase petitioned Congress to extend
the territorial boundaries west to include all of Lovely’s Purchase, including the
profitable salt works. Surrounding the Cherokee with white settlement would have
matched the ecological contours of the Arkansas Valley with the lines of cultural
settlement. In contrast to a general east-west division between white settlers and
Cherokees, the patchwork of white settlement based on soil fertility would have isolated
the Cherokees within a wider population of white farmers.140
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Other American settlers and politicians proposed a segregation policy more like
the Cherokees’. Matthew Arbuckle, commander at Fort Smith, argued for seeking a land
cession from the Osage west of Lovely’s Purchase to which Cherokees might remove.
His proposal was based on Indian interest in avoiding encirclement, but it required the
removal of Cherokees from their lands and re-settlement far to the west at the edge of the
fertile area of the prairies.141
In late 1826, the American patchwork settlement pattern became reality. Survey
teams drew townships onto the landscape, and within a year an Arkansas territorial
politician lauded the “three thousand souls” who had taken root in “the most healthy—
populous and wealthy portion of Arkansas.”142 Lovely County, created in 1827, walled
off the Cherokee from their western outlet, and filled in the unclaimed area on Stephen
Long’s 1822 map for white settlers. The American vision of explicitly dividing valley
settlement by overlapping ecological and racial lines had prevailed.
Cherokees found their rhetorical pleas for their civilized land use had become
exhausted. In April 1828, a literate, farming Cherokee named Nu-Tah-E-Tuil vehemently
denounced a memorial from the territorial legislature that Cherokees had no rights to
lands in Arkansas. Challenging the notion that Cherokees were not civilized, he
responded in the Arkansas Gazette, “What is civilization? Is it a practical knowledge of
agriculture? I am willing to compare the farms of this nation with those of the mass of
white population.”143 For Cherokees, the solution of a patchwork landscape was
equivalent to a slow death on limited land and a rejection of a decade of highly
coordinated agrarian rhetoric.
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In the spring of 1828, a desperate Cherokee delegation was sent to Washington
D.C. to seek a clear title for Lovely’s Purchase. Familiar council faces like Black Fox and
Thomas Graves, along with literate negotiators like Sequoyah and John Rogers, were
instructed explicitly to not negotiate a land cession. Success would have encouraged a
clear separation of cultures and a removal of white families from Lovely’s Purchase.
However, the delegation met staunch resistance to its request for increased land to the
west. During the negotiations, Cherokee chiefs again revealed their agrarian rhetorical
strategies by depicting western lands as inferior in quality to their claims along the
Arkansas, countering years of explicitly contrasting statements. However, aside from a
plan that would allow the Cherokees to have the land east from the falls of the Verdigris
to essentially the existing western border, American negotiators were willing to either
maintain the new status quo or remove Cherokees far to the west.144 In May of 1828, the
delegation signed an agreement relinquishing their Arkansas lands for lands immediately
west.
Amongst Arkansas Cherokees, the news of the treaty was not a sign of political
success but a gross betrayal of national trust. When news reached the Arkansas Cherokee
of the land sale, poles were erected upon which the heads of the delegation were to be
placed. The treaty delegates even remained for some weeks with the eastern Cherokee to
let tensions simmer.145 Principal chief John Jolly led an unsuccessful bid to reverse the
treaty. For Cherokee families and farmers, the immediate tragedy was that they would be
forced to abandon their farms east of Fort Smith. In addition to that immediate concern,
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the greatest ill was the uncertain precedent the treaty created for future federal land
appropriation west of the Mississippi.146
While the delegation disobeyed instructions to not sign a treaty, the Cherokee
treaty of 1828 effectively reversed the development of a patchwork settlement in favor of
a stark cultural division between Cherokees and white settlers in the Arkansas River
Valley. The treaty immediately curtailed white settlement in the recently-opened Lovely
County, and promised the Cherokees a “permanent home” with no “white population…to
annoy the Cherokees.” Having used agrarian rhetoric, survey systems and cartography to
limit competing claims to the region, the Cherokees had gained the tract they had sought
since at least 1820. In fact, the negotiators continued to successfully appeal the
landscapes’ relative agrarian potential—claiming that Lovely’s Purchase was inferior—to
gain nearly three million more acres than they had enjoyed in their previous location.
Though the treaty ceded the farms of the Cherokees, the Cherokee vision of a stark
cultural divide had been written into American law.
The effectiveness of Cherokees’ decade-old agrarian rhetoric was displayed in the
opening terms of the 1828 treaty. The treaty noted that the Cherokee lands in Arkansas
had become “unfavorable” and would lead to a “future degradation and misery.”147 The
implications were that limited farm land, and extensive mountainous tracks were
detrimental to a society that had turned to agriculture. The United States, anxious to
induce eastern Cherokees to emigrate, likely understood that farming practices were
crucial to Cherokee society. A grist mill was promised along with sufficient land for
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farmers and cattle grazers. The moral justification, then, of the treaty hearkened back to
the long decade of Cherokee council’s agrarian rhetoric.
Within the larger frame of settlement in the Arkansas River Valley, the 1828 treaty
marked a stunning blow to white settler interests in the territory. Thousands of white
settlers were forced to abandon their farms, and the promising region, thought to be wellsuited to an extension of cotton production, was curtailed by Cherokee settlement. Prior
to the treaty, the multiple strategies of the Cherokee council had compelled the territorial
legislature to complain that “it is a well-known fact to the people of Arkansas, that the
Cherokee have long desired to possess themselves of Lovely’s purchase, and that they
have exercised every art which their ingenuity could invent to induce the government to
withhold it from sale and settlement.”148 The Cherokees, with the acknowledgement of
their rivals, had successfully influenced, if not controlled, the settlement patterns in the
region, which might have otherwise favored white agriculturalists.

148

Memorial to the President by the Territorial Assembly, December 24, 1827, Territorial Papers 20: 572.

50

EPILOGUE
CHEROKEE REMOVAL
In the aftermath of the 1828 treaty, eastern Cherokee felt increased pressure to
immigrate west to the newly settled Lovely’s Purchase lands. That same year, the first
editions of the Cherokee Phoenix, the famed bi-lingual Cherokee newspaper, would
repackage many of the ecological arguments once used by the Arkansas Cherokees to
resist forced migration west.
Much as in Arkansas, the Eastern Cherokees editors of the Cherokee Phoenix
promoted an entirely agrarian identity. The earliest columns cited editorials about the
“scarce” game and “scanty crops of corn” that awaited Cherokees who refused to raise
livestock and utilized plows.149 Even sympathetic missionaries used the agrarian identity
to resist removal. Guest writers remarked that “agricultural pursuits engage the chief
attention of the people.” With the rich soils in the valleys and plains of Georgia, ideal for
producing Indian corn and cotton and orchards of apples and peaches, the rhetorical
question remained of “why we should remove them from this situation?”150 For Eastern
Cherokees, the land and Cherokee land use served to re-enforce their civility.
In addition to their agrarian rhetoric, the Phoenix sought eye-witness reports to
create a negative ecological depiction of the Arkansas Valley to support its anti-removal
position. As scientific reports flowed in to support the growing antagonism, eastern
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Cherokees ironically lambasted the landscape that Arkansas Cherokees had desired for a
decade. One report from an informant “who accompanied the surveyor” alone the eastern
treaty boundary, found it “the poorest country in the universe.”151 Others claimed that the
“Cherokees have ceded to the United States all their best land,” while Arkansas
Cherokees were reported to call it “poor, deficient in wood and water.” 152 Much as the
Arkansas Cherokees had denigrated their mountainous tract in order to negotiate
settlement interests, eastern Cherokees were doing the same by deriding the landscape
that Arkansas Cherokees and white settlers alike had long desired. They were in effect,
creating a new ecological history to build anti-removal sentiment within the Cherokee
nation by appealing to their own civilized qualities and the fundamental inadequacy of
the Arkansas Valley.
In a fascinating irony, the eastern Cherokee utilized the scientific reports of
American scientists by distorting the analysis of Major Stephen Long, who had extolled
the region’s potential a decade before. Quoting from the Connecticut Observer, the
Phoenix noted that the Long report described the proposed future residence of
southeastern Indians. Their excerpt quoted the exact passage of the “Great American
Desert” in which the conditions rendered “it an unfit residence for any but a nomad.”153
The very expedition that the Arkansas Cherokee chiefs had used to establish their
agricultural prowess was now being used to denigrate the western lands.
The debates over the fitness of the western lands for agriculture allowed Cherokee
writers to engage discussions of scientific veracity and exchange. Distrusting federal
officials, Cherokee writers found federal promises of the fertility of the Lovely’s
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Purchase landscape to be almost conspiratorial and untrue. Reports from the Secretary of
War as to the “fertility of soil and profusion of game” were included in some Phoenix
editions, but editors actively derided the source of such information.154 For the editors,
though, this was nothing more than propaganda in the form of environmental science,
meant to “misrepresent the Indians and mislead the public.”155 In other cases, they felt
that federal officials imagined Cherokees as only hunters and were thus incapable of
determining appropriate landscapes for the Cherokees. Much as Arkansas Cherokees had
helped define the ecological potential of the Arkansas Valley, the debate raged anew over
what sources of environmental knowledge could be trusted by native populations.
Eastern Cherokee also sought to make their Arkansas cousins a semi-savage foil
to their own society as a way of announcing the de-civilizing dangers of the western
frontier. In many editorials, writers expressed derision of the Arkansas Cherokees by
associating them with the hunter life style. Reports in the Cherokee Phoenix suggested
that the Arkansas Cherokees were “connected to us by every tie of blood…[but] differed
widely from this nation.” According to the writer, reunion would not work because they
had “traits more peculiar to Indians in a rude and uncivilized state.”156 In one unfiltered
libel, an editor commented, “sir, we are not Arkansas men. The chase we despise…we
delight in cultivating the soil.”157 In a landscape where “the voice of the civilized man
gave place to the yells of savage man and ferocious beasts,” Arkansas Cherokees were
portrayed as the savage man.158 In effect, the eastern Cherokee were recycling the
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Cherokee strategy towards the Osage by building up a case against removal that
denigrated their Arkansas cousins.
Seen through a rhetorical lens, the eastern Cherokee utilized an ecological
ideology to frame political debates in much the same way that their Arkansas cousins
had. While the audience for these statements seems to have been more internal than
external, the effect was to promote an agrarian Cherokee identity to position the nation to
better resist coerced removal and unfavorable settlement. These newspaper reports also
suggest that Arkansas Cherokees’ agrarian rhetoric, which seems to have convinced
Osage and white settlers to acknowledge its efficacy, had not reached or otherwise
convinced the eastern Cherokee. Within a decade, however, the eastern Cherokee would
be forced from their lands in the east and made to join their uncivilized cousins in the
Arkansas Valley.
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